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In Six Degrees of Separation, John Guare’s gender-reversed 
version of Pygmalion, a nameless young African American off 
the streets becomes a cultured young man through the 
teachings of his former lover, Trent Conway, the gay son of 
wealthy Manhattanites. Self-fashioned as the fictitious son of 
actor Sidney Poitier, Paul Poitier stabs himself to gain entry 
into the home of Flan 
and Ouisa Kittredge, an 
art dealer and his 
socialite wife. Once 
admitted, Paul charms 
the couple and their 
wealthy South African 
guest, Geoffrey Miller, 
with metaphysical 
musings on art, 
literature, and the 
theater and woos their 
palates with his culinary “wizardry” (Guare 27). In this respect, 
Paul presents himself as the kind of “philosophical dandy” to 
which philosopher and theorist Michel Foucault aspired in his 
late years. 
While Foucault is best known for his discourses on power and 
knowledge and his exposure of how human institutions train 
and control the modern subject, he was also deeply concerned 
with the aesth/ethics of the self in his late writings, which have 
unjustifiably attracted far less critical attention: “[W]hat finally 
mattered was not so much saving the world ... as it was 
achieving a certain piercing truthfulness, conveyed with 
exemplary beauty and wit, and combined with a sense of 
unashamed pleasure in the living of one’s life” (Miller 875-
76)—the philosophical life integrating aesthetics and ethics. 
“More than a theoretical discipline,” James Miller explains, 
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philosophy was once a way of life. To be a philosopher 
entailed striving for happiness, or peace of mind, aiming 
at one’s goal by living one’s life according to a 
thoughtfully examined set of precepts and beliefs, 
embodied in word and deed. 
The contemplation of theories might of course help 
properly regulate one’s life, in conjunction with some 
more or less elaborate set of empirical inquiries and 
corporeal exercises. [And thus,] when Socrates received 
an injunction from the oracle at Delphi, it was not to write 
books or to teach seminars in logic. It was rather, as he 
said, “to live the life of the philosopher, to examine myself 
and others.” (Miller 871; italics in original) 
Foucault, who lamented the “negligence” of the philosophical 
life in the modern world, attempted in his last years to live the 
life of the aesth/ethic philosopher, who acts “upon himself, to 
monitor, test, improve, and transform himself” (Pleasure 28). 
Paul Poitier of Six Degrees embodies this Foucauldian 
aesth/ethic philosopher to a great extent. Insofar as he enacts 
a deliberate and disciplined aesth/ethics of the self as Foucault 
enjoins, I sharply disagree with the views of Robert Andreach 
and C. W. E. Bigsby, who argue that Paul lacks a sense of self 
because of his protean quality and that “his inventions become 
all-consuming, until he treads the edge of madness” (43). 
Though unbridled aestheticism poses such a danger, Paul 
enacts throughout the play a purposive, ontologically lucid 
“elaboration of the self” as the telos of life (Foucault, 
“Enlightenment” 40, 42). 
First of all, Paul gives primacy to the essentials of well living 
over the incidentals of controversial social issues: 
But the world has been too heavy with the right-to-lifers—
protect the unborn, constitutional amendments, when 
does life begin? Or the converse—the end of life, the right 
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to die. Why is life, at this point in time, so focused upon 
the very beginning of life and the very end of life? What 
about the years we have to live between those two 
inexorable book ends? (Guare 45) 
Central to the philosophical imperative of self-examination, as 
part of well living, is imagination (Guare 34). As Paul reveals, 
however, this important faculty has sadly “moved out of the 
realm of being our link, our most personal link, with our inner 
lives and the world outside that world, this world we share” 
(Guare 34): 
The imagination has been so debased that imagination—
being imaginative—rather than being the linchpin of our 
existence, now stands as a synonym for something 
outside ourselves. Like science fiction. Or some new use 
for tangerine slices on raw pork chops—what an 
imaginative summer recipe—and Star Wars! So 
imaginative! And Lord of the Rings—all those dwarves—so 
imaginative.... (Guare 33) 
A disciplined practice of the imagination also happens to be the 
“linchpin” of Foucault’s ontology of the self as a modern 
subject. Following Baudelaire, Foucault defines modernity as 
“the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent” and being 
modern as “recapturing something eternal that is not beyond 
the present instant, nor behind it, but within it” 
(“Enlightenment” 40). In this sense, modernity, “distinct from 
fashion, which does no more than call into question the course 
of time, ... is the attitude that makes it possible to grasp the 
‘heroic’ aspect of the present moment” (40). In other words, 
Foucault’s philosophical dandy tries to extract the poetry within 
the present by “pursuing the free play of imagination wherever 
it may lead” (Miller 878). In one of his last interviews, Foucault 
urges: “in our society, art has become something which is 
related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life.... But 
couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the 
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lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?” 
(“Genealogy” 350). 
Indeed, art objects are prevalent in Six Degrees as décor and 
subjects of conversation but, more importantly, as emanations 
of the human soul. In speaking of the double-sided Kandinsky, 
Flan explains the Russian artist’s view that the process of 
aesthetic composition synaesthetically strikes the chords of the 
soul: “The choice of object that is one of the elements in the 
harmony of form must be decided only by a corresponding 
vibration in the human soul” (Guare 19). Here, the musical 
(and thus mathematical) reference suggests an ideal of 
aesthetic unity toward which Foucault strived in his aspiration 
to the philosophical aesthete. Yet James Miller, à la Montaigne, 
cautions thus about Foucault’s endeavour to become a work of 
art: 
After all, a human being is not an inert object like the 
lamp or the house. So what is a human being to do about 
all those aspects of itself—those moments of irresolution, 
impulsiveness, inconstancy, inconsistency, weakness of 
will, and self-deception that, though unmistakably a part 
of one’s life, can nevertheless not be fitted, without 
contradiction, into a whole that is organically unified? 
(888) 
Indeed, at the end of the play, Ouisa, in a moment of piercing 
self-awareness, bewails the lack of such organic unity in her 
life in the very terms that Flan uses to discuss art in the 
abstract, coldly detached from the reality of human lives: 
“There is colour in my life, but I’m not aware of any 
structure.... I am a collage of unaccounted-for brush strokes. 
I... am all... random” (Guare 118). Her life, filled with colour 
but lacking a unifying structure, reminds us of the double-sided 
Kandinsky, “painted on either side of the canvas in two 
radically different styles. One wild and vivid, the other somber 
and geometric.... Chaos, control. Chaos, control” (Six 
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Degrees)—two sides relegated to opposition rather than 
integration. Much like this painting, Ouisa’s life, exhibiting 
“wild and vivid” “chaos,” lacks “control”—something like that 
ontological telos essential to a Foucauldian aesth/ethic “self-
formation”: 
[A] process in which the individual delimits that part of 
himself that will form the object of his moral practice, 
defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, 
and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as 
his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, 
to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself. There is 
no specific moral action that does not refer to a unified 
moral conduct. (Foucault, Pleasure 28) 
How does one marshal vibrant, chaotic energy toward that 
aesth/ethics of living that Foucault understands as not only an 
imaginative but also a deliberate and disciplined exertion of the 
self (pratique de soi) (28)? How does one act toward that telos 
of “regulative ideal of wholeness” (Foucault, Pleasure 27; Miller 
887) without getting lost in the aesth/ethic endeavour as Paul 
does by advancing the aesthetic pursuit in reckless disregard 
of the dissimilar needs of others? 
In modernity, art and ethics have not been easy bedfellows. An 
“inherent and perhaps irreconcilable conflict between art and 
morality or between aesthetic and ethical consciousness” 
arises, as Eliot Deutsch keenly observes, “from the recognition 
that, on the one hand, art and morality are kindred forms of 
spiritual life and, on the other, there are sharp differences 
between them and that, accordingly, they make opposing 
claims upon us” (81). Historically, as Deutsch explains, “[t]he 
dominant presupposition from the Hellenistic period to the 
Renaissance was simply that art was subservient to (or could 
in no way be separated from) the demands of morality, as 
theologically and politically defined and understood” (82). In 
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modern times, however, “art has established its autonomy” 
simply as art: 
Many (at least non-Marxist) aestheticians and critics today 
would even go so far as to say that the only “goodness” in 
art is of a strictly aesthetic kind. A work of art that is 
aesthetically right is simply “good” by virtue of this 
rightness—without moral remainder. We allow intrusions 
from the ethical into art only insofar as they can be taken 
over and entirely assimilated by purely aesthetic 
considerations. (Deutsch 82) 
In other words, it is the job of the artist “to add to the world 
objects and ideas—delineations, symphonies—which ought to 
be there, and whose end is contemplation and appreciation; 
things which deserve to become the focus of a truly 
disinterested affection” (Gass qtd. in Deutsch 82). 
In an effort to reconcile aesthetics and ethics, Deutsch 
maintains, however, that 
 [c]reativity ... always manifests concern; and thus by its 
very nature, art is a celebration of personhood and world, 
if not in their given actualities at least in their (real) 
potentialities.... [S]eeing the gross stupidity, selfishness, 
and perversity—the evil, in short—that seems always to 
intrude into human affairs; being aware of that 
nothingness, the obliteration, that appears finally to 
render all human achievements futile, the artist, 
nevertheless, as artist, possesses that loving 
consciousness which acknowledges an intrinsic value to 
self and other.... Art cannot help but be celebrative.... 
The positive moral dimension of art as art ... has to do ... 
with that special lovingness which informs imagination 
and intuition and that is at the heart of artistic creativity... 
In at least this sense, then, all genuine art is inherently 
moral. And it affords the grounding of art in social 
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community... a coming together through shared values 
and interests... a reaching out to others in and through 
the celebrative art-making and aesthetic experience. A 
communion to be established with others is always implicit 
in all art making and experience. (87) 
This element of human connection becomes even more 
significant in the Foucauldian endeavour to make one’s life a 
work of art, which unavoidably entails human interactions and 
the ethics implicit in these encounters with others. Sidney Zink 
presents a comparison of the seemingly opposing claims of art 
and morality, which will be useful in the following examination 
of Paul’s aesth/ethic pursuit of self: 
Morality insists upon the interconnectedness of 
experiences; art insists upon the self-containedness of 
each particular experience. The moral man scrutinizes the 
given action for its relations to other actions; the 
aesthetic man absorbs himself in the immediate 
experience. Morality insists upon the inviolability of the 
man, art upon the inviolability of the experience. Morality 
recognizes the fact of dimensionality in life; art stresses 
the fact of qualitativeness. The first would make life 
consistent; the second would make it intense. Morality 
speaks in the interest of the whole, art in the interest of 
the part. (qtd. in Deutsch 81) 
By examining the actions of Paul Poitier as an aesth/ethic 
subject, this essay explores the possibilities and challenges of 
integrating the aesthetic and ethical imperatives of self-
formation within the limits of one’s historical and cultural 
situation. In Guarian terms linking art and life, how does one 
find the salutary balance between chaos and control; how does 
one give structure, or teleological purpose, to a life of random 
color? While the scholarship on Guare’s play readily includes 
discussions on race, class, and sexuality, notably lacking are 
rigorous ethical examinations that explore the play’s signature 
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concerns of aesthetics and ethics embedded in the issues of 
race and economics. A discerning examination of Paul’s 
aesth/ethic pursuit within the framework of Foucauldian and 
Aristotelian ethics, I believe, illuminates the play in 
unprecedented ways, at the same time offering valuable ethical 
insights into our own endeavors to live the good life. 
I 
Through the free play of his imagination, the Foucauldian 
subject works on the aesth/ethic “elaboration of the self” as 
the telos of life (Foucault, “Enlightenment” 40, 42). Paul, the 
Foucauldian aesthete in Six Degrees, shows how imagination is 
there 
to sort out your nightmare, to show you the exit from the 
maze of your nightmare, to transform the nightmare into 
dreams that become your bedrock. If we don’t listen to 
that voice, it dies. It shrivels. It vanishes…. The 
imagination is not our escape. On the contrary, the 
imagination is the place we all trying to get to. (Guare 34, 
62-63; emphasis added) 
The imagination, the power of the mind, is the means and end 
of the aesth/ethic self, which, according to Paul, desires such 
Platonic ideals as beauty, quality, and eternal friendship 
(Guare 112, 99). Immanuel Kant, whose famous essay on 
enlightenment became a key pronouncement for the 
intellectual movement of that name, states that enlightenment 
through the exercise of reason is man’s exit (Ausgang) from 
his self-incurred “immaturity” (Unmündigkeit), meaning a 
mental dependence on others. This exit is most effectively 
manifested through disenfranchisement—the loss of political 
voice—as implied by the literal sense of unmündig (Kant). 
Revising Kant’s view on enlightenment, imagination, in Paul’s 
conception, is both means and end. It is the “exit,” “our out” 
(Guare 63, 62) engaging us in the ceaseless act of 
enlightening: “The imagination is the noon voice that sees 
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clearly and says yes, this is what I want for my life” (62). But 
because we are subject to whatever constraints our historic 
and cultural situation places upon us, “Our imagination teaches 
us our limits and then how to grow beyond those limits” 
(Guare 62), in Paul’s case, poverty, blackness, and 
homosexuality. In Foucauldian language, the “ontology of the 
self” entails “a historico-practical test of the limits that we may 
go beyond, and thus ... work carried out by ourselves upon 
ourselves as free beings” (“Enlightenment” 47). Foucault, who 
uses Kant’s essay to clarify his own views regarding reason, 
freedom, and the aesth/ethic imperatives of modern 
subjectivity, believes less in finding “an exit” from the 
limitations upon our lives than in “illuminating and critically 
testing” such limits through the possibilities of self-creation in 
daily life; freedom, though historically and circumstantially 
limited, offers “concretely possible transformation” (Seppä 
sections 6 and 3). Likewise, Paul affirms that disciplined 
imagination is not ultimately “our escape. On the contrary, the 
imagination is the place we are all trying to get to” (Guare 63), 
the site and practice of the aesth/ethic self in a contingent 
world. 
To go beyond the economic, racial, and gendered limits 
imposed on his historically situated self, Paul commits himself, 
in Foucauldian terms, to the “ascetic elaboration of the self” 
through a “transfiguring play of freedom with reality” 
(“Enlightenment” 42). With the aid of Trent Conway (who 
provides the way for him to con the wealthy Manhattanites), 
Paul submits to the “task of producing himself” (Foucault, 
“Enlightenment” 42) 
as a theatrical work in progress, elaborating a kind of 
double of oneself, using artifice to suppress unwanted 
aspects of one’s nature, representing outwardly only what 
one chooses. How one fashions this self-contained double 
will to a large degree be a matter of taste, but also an 
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outcome of what Foucault at the end of his life called “a 
deliberate practice of liberty.” (Foucault, “Ethic of Care” 
qtd. in Miller 888) 
Accordingly, the film version of Six Degrees shows numerous 
shot cuts to Paul practicing before a mirror; in Baudelairean 
words, he lives and sleeps before a mirror (Baudelaire qtd. in 
Miller 888). Propelled by a vision of personal happiness, the 
gay, socially isolated Trent Conway, “the Henry Higgins of our 
time” (Guare 81) fashions for his lover Paul “a new identity” 
(79)—the cultured son of acclaimed barrier-breaking actor, 
Sidney Poitier—beyond the historical and cultural limits of 
poverty, race, and homosexuality: 
I’ll make you the most eagerly sought-after young man in 
the East. And then I’ll come into one of these homes one 
day—and you’ll be there and I’ll be presented to meet you 
for the first time and our friendship will be witnessed by 
my friends, our parents’ friends. If it all happens under 
their noses, they can’t judge me. They can’t disparage 
you. (79) 
It takes, moreover, a gritty imagination to break through the 
socio-economic barrier that effectively impedes the association 
of a black man off the streets with Manhattan socialites; with a 
new turn on the phrase “cut a figure,” Paul takes the knife to 
himself, sculpting a wound that will admit him into the world of 
the New York upper crust. In the words of Foucault, Paul 
imposes on himself “a discipline more despotic than the most 
terrible religions,” making “of his body, his behavior, his 
feelings and his passions, his very existence a work of art” 
(“Enlightenment” 41-42). 
Once admitted, Paul successfully presents “a figure of artful 
wholeness” (Miller 888) with a “wild quality,” according to 
Ouisa, “yet a real elegance and a real concern and a real 
consideration,”—a “dreamboat,” in her daughter Tess’s 
sneering words, who self-consciously strikes poses for 
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admiration, confessing “a thrill to be looked at” (Guare 60-61, 
38). “By cultivating the sexual body as a site of aesthetic re-
creation,” Paul, as a philosophical dandy, “represents a culture 
of difference and differentiation” resonant of “Baudelaire’s 
descriptions of the androgynous gender of dandies” and 
thereby manifests “not only an individual lifestyle, but also 
one’s philosophical, moral and political attitudes toward 
present society” (Seppä sec. 5). A figure androgynously 
alluring to the other characters—male and female—Paul 
emphatically queries the homophobia in the wake of the AIDS 
epidemic.1 
The night at the Kittredges is an extraordinary one during 
which Paul enchants his audience intellectually, aesthetically, 
and gastronomically. In his later phone conversation with 
Ouisa, Paul confides, “That night was the happiest night I ever 
had” because “[y]ou let me use all the parts of myself that 
night” (Guare 106-07). Ouisa confirms, “It was magical. That 
Salinger stuff.... Your cooking,” and later reveals at the 
Banister dinner party: “He did more for us in a few hours than 
our children ever did” (107, 117). When the rapturous evening 
comes to a close, Paul, alone again, indiscreetly invites a gay 
hustler into the Kittredge residence. As he later explains, “I 
was so happy. I wanted to add sex to it” (108). This action 
repulses the Kittredges, who, in feeling their privacy violated, 
throw Paul back to the streets from whence he came (even as 
                                               
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers who gave me the 
impetus to revamp my essay into what it is now—a more cohesive 
examination with a stronger theoretical framework. 
1 At the play’s end, Ouisa reminds Flan: “You were attracted to him .... 
Attracted by youth and his talent and the embarrassment prospect of 
being in the movie version of Cats,” to which she refers earlier as being 
“star fuckers” (117, 30). For a gender reading on Flan’s complex 
relationship with Paul, see Jennifer Gillan, who argues that he is 
“disturbed that his liberal sense of cross-racial identification (his ability 
not to notice Paul is black) may have crossed over into some erotic 
identification with Paul as homosexual” (62). Without specific mention of 
physical attraction, Elizabeth avows in the film version that Paul “opened 
up a whole new world to us.” 
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they royally reap the rewards of Paul’s decisive role in winning 
the wealthy Geoffrey Miller’s financial backing for Flan’s 
lucrative sale of a Cezanne painting). It is at this point that 
lying and deceit first emerge as an ethical issue in Paul’s 
aesthetic endeavor. 
II 
Foucault and Aristotle—unlikely philosophical bedfellows—offer 
a theoretical framework through which we can examine the 
ethical ambiguities of the aesth/ethic philosopher, as 
manifested in Paul Poitier. Like Kant, Foucault considers a 
subject’s intellectual autonomy “essential to [his] ability to 
exercise critical judgement, free from dominant beliefs, norms 
and desires” (Seppä sec. 1). Moreover, “for an action to be 
‘moral,’ it must not be reducible to an act or a series of acts 
conforming to a rule, a law, or a value” (Foucault, Pleasure 
28). Foucault uses the conduct of fidelity further to elucidate 
his understanding of the moral conduct required of the 
aesth/ethical philosopher: 
One can, for example, practice conjugal fidelity and 
comply with the precept that imposes it, because one 
acknowledges oneself to be a member of the group that 
accepts it, declares adherence to it out loud, and silently 
preserves it as a custom [tribal tradition]. But one can 
practice it, too, because one regards oneself as an heir to 
a spiritual tradition that one has the responsibility of 
maintaining or reviving [religious faith]; one can also 
practice fidelity in response to an appeal, by offering 
oneself as an example [social model], or by seeking to 
give one’s personal life a form that answers to criteria of 
brilliance, beauty, nobility, or perfection [Aristo-Platonic 
virtue]. (Foucault 27) 
The advantage to this multivalent understanding of moral 
action is the freedom it allows the ethical subject to construct a 
pattern of moral conduct, responsive to his historical and 
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cultural situation. The absence of “universally valid norms for 
human action and morality,” however, also presents the 
unsavory possibility that a subject may rape, kill, or commit 
other crimes in a delusion of realizing his freedom and 
“creating a unique aesthetics of the self” (Seppä sec. 1). What 
are the suicide bombings of terrorists if not fanatical acts of 
violence executing the radical values of certain despotic 
groups? 
Despite these possibilities of aesth/ethics abused for evil ends, 
Foucault is right not to yield to the deontological approach of 
following a certain set of rules and laws and instead to adopt 
an Aristotelian situational approach. Aware of the complexity 
and particularity of ethical action relative to the subject and to 
the situation, Aristotle explains that 
the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in 
outline and not precisely, … that the accounts we demand 
must be in accordance with the subject-matter; matters 
concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for 
us have not fixity, any more than matters of health. The 
general account being of this nature, the account of 
particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they 
do not fall under any art or precept but the agents 
themselves must in each case consider what is 
appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of 
medicine or of navigation. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
II.2.1104a 2-8) 
The general rule that Aristotle offers, however, is that one 
must act according to the golden mean; yet even this conduct 
of moderation is not a rigid arithmetic mean but rather a 
flexible moral barometer moving within the extremes of 
deficiency and excess, relative to the agent and the particular 
circumstance. Practical wisdom, or virtuous prudence, counsels 
the best action at the best time, in the best way, for the best 
end (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.6.1106b 20-22). By this 
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standard, the violent means of terrorist acts, in complete 
disregard of human life, can never justify the worthy ends that 
they purport. 
Paul’s actions of deceit are more complicated. In discussing 
truthfulness as a virtue of social intercourse, Aristotle does not 
treat “lying and truth-telling in general” but rather in reference 
to “correct presentations or misrepresentations of one’s 
possession of things held in good repute (endoxa)” (Zembaty 
9), which is precisely the issue with regard to Paul. While 
Aristotle holds that “falsehood is in itself mean and culpable” 
(Nicomachean Ethics IV.7.1127a 28-29; italics in the original), 
he distinguishes between lies that are just and unjust. In 
general, “we call those acts just that tend to produce and 
preserve happiness [flourishing] and its components for the 
political society” (Nicomachean Ethics V.1.1129b18-19). 
Justice is highly valued in Aristotelian ethics as one of two 
virtues “most useful to others.... [It] is a virtue which assigns 
to each man his due in conformity with the law; injustice 
claims what belongs to others, in opposition to the law” 
(Aristotle, Rhetoric I.15.1366b6-11). Laws, as Jane Zembaty 
explains, 
are prescribed for the good of the political community .... 
Thus, the specific moral badness of those lies which are 
instances of injustice does not consist simply in their 
being lies. Rather their badness lies in their serving as a 
means to an unfair gain of goods or an unfair dimunition 
of burdens—states of affairs that work against the good of 
the political community in contrast to just acts which are 
useful to others and promote the good of the polis. 
(Zembaty 10) 
While Paul is guilty of falsehood in the respect that he 
appropriates a fictitious persona, he does not receive an 
“unfair gain of [material] goods” vis-à-vis Dr. Fine. The 
obstetrician “courageously” goes home “with a policeman” to 
 97 
Pivot 1.1 
arrest Paul for “breaking and entering,” but the officer cannot 
do so since Dr. Fine offered Paul “the keys to the house” and 
“nothing’s taken from the house” except the consumption of a 
little brandy (Guare 66). Nor does Paul enjoy an “unfair gain of 
[material] goods” vis-à-vis the Kittredges since they will make 
several million dollars on the sale of Cezanne painting thanks 
to Paul’s stellar effect on Geoffrey Miller. Dr. Fine is, however, 
disturbed by Paul’s misrepresentation of his identity, social 
status, and honor; retorting that he gave Paul his keys “under 
false pretenses. This fucking black kid crack addict came into 
my office lying,” and he wants Paul to be arrested for “fraud” 
(Guare 66), in American law, “an intentional misrepresentation 
of a material existing fact made by one person to another with 
knowledge of its falsity and for the purpose of inducing the 
other person to act, and upon which the other person relies 
with resulting injury or damage” (“Fraud”).2 In the absence of 
economic harm, the shock and injured pride that Fine 
experiences in discovering Paul’s charade do not in themselves 
constitute actionable damage for mental distress. 
Paul’s interaction with the Kittredges is a little more 
complicated. In admitting the hustler into the Kittredges’ 
home, Paul transgresses the dictates of guest hospitality, 
according to which both host and guest must conduct 
themselves in ways of mutual respect. In capping the evening 
at the Kittredges with sex, Paul misconstrues sensual pleasure, 
an external good, as the end rather than the auxiliary of 
virtue: pleasure is a necessary but not sufficient element of 
                                               
2 Also, philosopher T. M. Scanlon reviews the conditions by which Person 
A’s treatment of Person B would constitute wrongful subversion of B: a) 
the lack of consent and/or the lack of opportunity to give or withhold 
such consent; b) B’s refusal of consent, given this opportunity (21-23). 
In the situation of neither the Kittredges nor Dr. Fine did Paul take 
advantage of their lack of information or require some active 
contribution from them, which would prompt them to withhold their 
consent. Paul did not take anything from their homes. 
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virtuous conduct.3 Nonetheless, Paul’s violation of the 
Kittredges’ respect and right to privacy in their home is 
properly seen in Aristotelian ethics as an act of intemperance 
rather of vice and injustice. Paul’s imprudent act of bringing 
the hustler into the Kittredges’ residence fits “the accurate 
picture of a male adolescent” (Guare 33) that he, during his 
discourse on J. D. Salinger, so insightfully paints of Holden 
Caulfield—ironically ignorant of its self-reference. Along with 
the enormous economic windfall the Kittredges enjoyed and 
whatever psychological and emotional harm that they 
experienced in seeing a naked stranger in their home, we must 
also consider the ontological insights and sensuous pleasures 
that the couple experienced that evening in order to assess 
whether or not Paul’s conduct as a philosophical dandy was 
ethical. To wit, we must question whether the aesth/ethics that 
Paul imparts is praiseworthy or whether he is a philosophical 
fraud acting on a falsehood about his true identity. In short, 
does his pretense as Sidney Poitier’s son vitiate the aesth/ethic 
mode of life that he promotes? 
To be sure, the Kittredges do not respond identically to Paul. 
Ouisa is the one more patently moved by Paul: “I just loved 
the kid so much. I wanted to reach out to him” (Guare 31). 
Though less expressive, Flan is also impressed by Paul. When 
Paul finishes his discourse on The Catcher in the Rye, Flan 
indirectly praises him: “I hope your muggers read every word” 
(35). Later at the Banister dinner party, Flan exhibits less 
warmth toward Paul: 
OUISA. He did more for us in a few hours than our 
children ever did. And he 
                                               
3 Aristotle, Rhetoric *I.9.1366a: “The noble, then, is that which, being 
desirable in itself is at the same time worthy of praise, or which, being 
good, is pleasant because it is good. If this is the noble, then virtue 
must of necessity be noble, for, being good, it is worthy of praise”; 
Eudemian Ethics, VIII.3.1249b 18. 
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wanted to be your child. Don’t let that go. He sat out in 
that park and said, “That man is my father.” He’s in 
trouble, and we don’t know how to help him. 
FLAN. Help him? My God! We could’ve been killed. Throats 
slashed. 
OUISA. You were attracted to him. 
FLAN. Oh, please. Cut me out of that pathology right now. 
(Six Degrees) 
Whether or not Ouisa’s concern for Paul is a “pathology,” it is 
important to bear in mind here that Flan may be expressing 
himself more reservedly—despite his self-congratulatory 
statement, “We have hearts”—because he is speaking in 
public, as a former “lawyer ... terrified of libel” and 
embarrassed by Paul’s story of Flan’s abandonment of his 
“Negro son” (Guare 117, 22, 82). As Ouisa says to Paul during 
their conversation the evening before, “My husband feels you 
betrayed him” (98). Tellingly, however, Flan tows the line 
without a word when Ouisa—as a direct reaction to his outburst 
against Paul—resolves to skip the schmoozing before the 
Sotheby’s auction in order to escort Paul to the police. 
When Paul asks her point blank: “Do you feel I betrayed you? 
If you do, I’ll hang up and never bother you again—,” Ouisa 
merely returns a solicitous question, implying that far from 
being betrayed, she has gained a whole new perspective on 
the “paltry” life they led and “envied” Paul’s aesth/ethic mode 
of living more than he “envied us” (Guare 98, 117). As the 
best tribute to his memory, Ouisa seeks to emulate him by 
taking on the “task of producing [her]self” (Foucault, 
“Enlightenment” 42): to “keep the experience” (Guare 118) of 
Paul, by accounting for the brush strokes, by adding structure 
to the colour in her life. Although the connection to celebrity, 
like the knife wound that he fakes, gives Paul a ready 
audience, it is ultimately his self-fashioned, aesth/ethic 
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“wizardry” (Guare 27) that enchants all who encounter him. 
Young Juliet of Shakespeare’s tragedy of “star-crossed lovers” 
rightly says: “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose / By 
any other name would smell as sweet” (Shakespeare, Romeo 
and Juliet, 2.1.85-86). In the light of his cavalier disdain of 
money (“Money is the one commodity you can always get” [Six 
Degrees]), Paul deploys deceit to advance something like the 
Foucauldian ontological self or Baudelairean “man of 
modernity” (Foucault, “Enlightenment” 40) through “a kind of 
ethical self-preservation, maintaining integrity by a strategic 
practice of disintegrity” (Bristol 28). In sum, Paul’s conduct at 
the Kittredges is more ethical than not—both from a utilitarian 
assessment of a net increase in good and an Aristotelian 
situated assessment of promoting the happiness, or well living, 
of self and other. In his art of living—to become a work of art—
Paul in the pink shirt associated with him, is like the “pale color 
being forced to carry the weight of the picture ... [a] burst of 
color asked to carry so much” (Guare 14) within the Cezanne 
painting that Flan is discussing at the very moment Paul first 
enters. 
III 
It is one thing to deceive the likes of wealthy socialites like the 
Kittredges; it is quite another to ingratiate oneself into the life 
of a poor young couple like Elizabeth and Rick and to squander 
their meager savings for the sake of experience, for a night of 
sensuous pleasures. In his compulsion for aesthetic 
experience, Paul, by deceit, coaxes the impressionable Rick to 
lend him money out of the couple’s joint account. The story 
about needing two hundred fifty dollars to meet his father in 
Maine is as it turns out, merely a ploy to invite Rick to an 
extravagant night on the town—wining, dining, and dancing at 
the Rainbow Room—capped with sex in a carriage in Central 
Park. For Rick, this is figuratively and literally the experience of 
a lifetime, “the greatest night I ever had” (Guare 91), for, 
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indeed, upon the realization of his gross breach of Elizabeth’s 
trust, he promptly takes his life. 
Paul’s interaction with the young couple as opposed to the 
wealthy socialites escalates into a fatal casualty. The aggrieved 
Elizabeth demands retribution: “I want [Paul] dead. He took all 
our money. He took my life. Rick’s dead! You bet your life I’ll 
press charges” (Guare 93). For what? Involuntary 
manslaughter? Fraud? First of all, Paul would not be 
prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter for two reasons: first, 
because his deception was not “by its nature dangerous to 
human life or was done with reckless disregard for human life” 
(“Involuntary manslaughter”). Second, it was not reasonably 
foreseeable that his deception would cause Rick to commit 
suicide. 
If Paul is not accountable for involuntary manslaughter, let’s 
examine whether he is accountable for tort fraud, which 
indirectly contributed to Rick’s suicide. To this end, we must 
answer two questions: a) did Paul unlawfully, designedly and 
knowingly, appropriate the property of another? and b) did he 
act with criminal intent? (“Fraud”). While Paul “designedly and 
knowingly” deceived Rick and Elizabeth with a fraudulent 
reason to borrow money, he did not unlawfully appropriate the 
two hundred fifty dollars that Rick voluntarily lent him. 
Moreover, Paul did not use the money solely to his advantage; 
he got Rick unwittingly to finance an extravagant night for the 
two to experience together. While Elizabeth’s situation—the 
loss of Rick as well as her savings—is truly unfortunate, the 
charges, legally, do not amount to much— with a sentence—if 
that far—of “A few months tops” (Guare 111), according to 
Ouisa. 
Regardless of the legality of Paul’s deceit, an Aristotelian and a 
Foucauldian analysis of ethical action reveals precisely how his 
unjust manner of spending the couple’s money, 
misrepresenting it as his own, results in exuberant experience 
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at the price of harm to others, suggesting the dangers of 
unbridled aestheticism. In the sense that both Paul and Rick 
seek experience as something beyond the mere anecdotes that 
the Manhattan socialites relish, they eschew the pose of the 
Baudelairean flâneur even if they do not quite approach his 
“man of modernity” that Foucault so extols: 
The flâneur, the idle, strolling spectator, is satisfied to 
keep his eyes open, to pay attention and to build up a 
storehouse of memories. In opposition to the flâneur, 
Baudelaire describes the man of modernity: “Away he 
goes, hurrying, searching.... Be very sure that this man ... 
—this solitary, gifted with an active imagination, 
ceaselessly journeying across the great human desert—
has an aim loftier than that of a mere flâneur, ... 
something other than the fugitive pleasure of 
circumstance.... He makes it his business to extract from 
fashion whatever element it may contain of poetry within 
history. (Foucault, “Enlightenment” 40-41) 
While commendably evading the attitude of the flâneur, Paul 
and Rick, nonetheless, act imprudently in disregard of the well-
being of others, thereby inducing tragedy. 
Oscar Wilde, the leading figure of the Aesthetic movement in 
fin de siècle England, espouses “the ideal that the utility of 
one’s actions should be to create the maximal amount of 
beauty and pleasure in one’s life, and nothing more” (Duggan). 
Indeed, based upon his preface as well as Lord Henry’s 
professorial lectures, his novel The Picture of Dorian Gray 
seems whole-heartedly to promote a purely aesthetic mode of 
life. Nonetheless, the deterioration of Dorian Gray’s portrait, a 
record of the aesthete’s wholesale dissipation, presents Wilde’s 
more qualified view toward aestheticism. According to Patrick 
Duggan, 
Wilde realized and depicted in the life of Dorian Gray, a 
need for a more controlled and deliberate approach to 
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aestheticism, without which morality will inevitably be 
elusive. The adoption of unrestrained aestheticism, as 
exhibited by Dorian, results in a lack of remorse, self-
absorption, and intellectual regression. 
He admires actress Sibyl Vane only for her art, and when she 
leaves the theater, she “no longer serves a purpose in Dorian’s 
aesthetic life” (Duggan). Even as he lives by the uselessness of 
art, Dorian disposes of Sibyl as a useless good, directly 
triggering her suicide. “[I]n the practice of Wilde’s 
aestheticism,” Duggan concludes, “forethought and constraint 
are necessities, yet too often lacking, and without them, one is 
doomed to suffer the same fate as Dorian Gray.” 
While the causal link to Rick’s suicide is even thinner in Paul’s 
case, Duggan’s comment on Wilde’s aestheticism is as 
germane to Dorian as to Paul. “All excess, as well as all 
renunciation, brings its own punishment”, Wilde concludes in 
Dorian Gray (248), invoking Delphic wisdom.4 The 
absoluteness of this rule is echoed in Aristotle’s injunction 
against lying. As much as Paul inspired others toward a 
conscious pursuit of self-flourishing and the audience looked 
forward to the promises of Ouisa and his “[e]verlasting 
friendship” (Guare 99), Paul falls victim to his failure to follow 
the rules of society. While Juliet is right to protest, “What’s in a 
name?” Paul, in his stubborn refusal to reveal his real name, 
fatally prevents Ouisa from helping him when Manhattan traffic 
prevents the Kittredges from arriving in time to deliver him to 
the police. “[K]indness and affection” (Guare 110), tragically, 
are not enough to combat the dual limits of existential 
randomness and social inequalities within the judicial system 
that the New York traffic and the police station respectively 
emblemize. As Wilde, Foucault, and Guare suggest, the 
aesth/ethic pursuit of the self is enacted through disciplined 
                                               
4 The Delphic Oracle proclaims two premier injunctions: “Know thyself” 
and “Nothing in excess.” 
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free play of the imagination, a deliberate integration of “chaos” 
and “control,” of public and private morality within the limits of 
our historical and cultural situation: “A moral action” aims to 
establish “a moral conduct that commits an individual, not only 
to other actions always in conformity with values and rules, but 
to a certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of 
the ethical subject” (Foucault, Pleasure 28). Otherwise, one 
could well “lose the painting” (Guare 46), as Flan’s dream 
portends, and, more fatally, lose oneself, as Wilde’s The 
Picture of Dorian Gray implies. The robust use of the 
imagination to promote the aesth/ethic self beyond one’s 
economic, race, and gender limits must ultimately be bound by 
our moral responsibility to others—a point on which Foucault 
and Aristotle converge.  
Works Cited 
Andreach, Robert. Creating the Self in the Contemporary 
American Theatre. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 
1998. Print. 
Aristotle. Introduction to Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. New 
York: Random House, 1947. Print. 
---. Eudemian Ethics: Books I, II, and VIII. Trans. Michael 
Woods. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992. Print. 
---. Rhetoric. Ed. J. H. Freese. Perseus Digital Library. Tufts 
University. Web. 19 Feb. 2011. 
Bigsby, C. W. E. Contemporary American Playwrights. New 
York: Cambridge UP, 1999. 40-43. Print. 
Bristol, Michael. “Confusing Shakespeare’s Characters with 
Real People: Reflections on Reading in Four Questions.” 
Shakespeare and Character: Theory, History, 
Performance, and Theatrical Persons. Eds. Paul Yachnin 




Deutsch, Eliot. Essays on the Nature of Art. Albany: SUNY P, 
1996. Print. 
Duggan, Patrick. “The Conflict Between Aestheticism and 
Morality in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray.” WR: 
Journal of the Arts & Sciences Writing Program 1 (2008-
2009). Web. 5 Dec. 2010. 
Foucault, Michel. “The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of 
Freedom,” The Final Foucault. Eds. James Bernauer and 
David Rasmussen. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1988. Print. 
---. “On the Genealogy of Ethics.” Trans. Catherine Porter. The 
Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon, 
1985. 340-72. Print. 
---. The Use of Pleasure. Trans. Robert Harley. New York: 
Pantheon, 1985. Print. 
---. “What Is Enlightenment?” Trans. Catherine Porter. The 
Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon, 
1985. 32-50. Print. 
“Fraud.” ’Lectric Law Library. Web. 5 Dec. 2010. 
Gillan, Jennifer. “‘No One Knows You're Black!’: Six Degrees of 
Separation and the Buddy Formula.” Cinema Journal 40.3 
(2001): 47-68. Print. 
Guare, John. Six Degrees of Separation. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1994. Print. 
“Involuntary manslaughter.” ’Lectric Law Library. Web. 5 Dec. 
2010. 
Kant, Immanuel. “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist 
Aufklärung?” [“Answer to the Question: What Is 
Enlightenment?”] Prometheus Online. Dec. 5, 1783. Web. 
5 Dec. 2010. 
 106 
The Aest/ethics of Imagination and Deceit in Guare’s Six Degrees of Separation 
Miller, James. “The Prophet and the Dandy: Philosophy as a 
Way of Life in Nietzsche and Foucault.” Social Research 
65.4 (1998): 871-896. Print. 
Seppä, Anita. “Foucault, Enlightenment and the Aesthetics of 
the Self,” Contemporary A 
Unhae Langis is the author of Passion, Prudence, and Virtue in 
Shakespearean Drama (Continuum, 2011) and numerous 
articles. She is presently working on a book on Shakespeare 
and happiness. 
 
